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Sovereign debt and international law
Or on the intricacies of theory and practice
Events of historic proportions often feel anti-climactic. In March 2012, Greece, a
developed capitalist state and a member of the Eurozone, engaged in the biggest debt
restructuring venture to date, covering 200 billion euros (260 billion USD) and reducing
the private debt burden by over 50%. The exchange was not purely voluntary, since the
majority of bonds were subjected to Greek law and an amendment made the offer
compulsory for all holders of such bonds, subject to approval by creditors holding two-
thirds of outstanding principal. The triggering of these Collective Action Clauses (CACs)
led the Determinations Committee of the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) to declare a ‘credit event’. Even though official pronouncements
carefully avoided the word, much of the press and relevant literature saw this as the
biggest default to date and at the same time as a confirmation of the unthinkable: EU
member states could now default. Despite fears for immediate and uncontrollable
contagion, the ‘credit event’ did not spread to other unstable economies of the European
South, such as Portugal, Spain or Italy. After a brief period of optimism and successive
years of harsh austerity the Greek sovereign debt stands at 176,9% of the GDP , while the
Italian sovereign debt exceeds 132% of the GDP and Portugal’s is just below 130%. The
Eurozone might not have exploded (yet), but perceptions that the sovereign debt crisis
was resolved, or that it is a uniquely Greek problem, appear distinctly misplaced. In this
respect, the special edition of the Yale Journal of International Law on sovereign debt
curated by Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Matthias Goldmann, is a highly topical and
relevant intervention that approaches an urgent issue of global political economy from an
international legal perspective and articulates specific – if incremental – proposals for
the application of general principles of international law to sovereign debt restructuring.
Reconciling critical scholarship and responsible practice
It is worth reflecting on this project together with another recent publication  by Isabel
Feichtner, who reflected on the possibility to reconcile critical scholarship and
responsible practice of international law. This might be a paradoxical anchor, since
Bohoslavsky’s and Goldmann’s approach to the discipline is not immediately recognisable
as ‘critical’. In fact, in their co-authored piece, the two editors argue that ‘[i]t is the
foremost task of legal practice and scholarship to make sense of this chaos and create a
fairly consistent order by identifying and, where possible, codifying principles’, which is
arguably a fairly orthodox approach to the discipline. However, both contributions share
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a profound discomfort with the contemporary state of global political economy, they
show a clear appreciation for the role of international law in the construction of this
problematic order, and favour the democratisation and social embeddedness of markets,
instead of either their contemporary omnipotence or their transcendence. Indeed,
Bohoslavksy’s and Goldmann’s article constitutes a good example of how ‘institutional
imagination and experimentation entails an entanglement of scholarship with practice as
experimentation in practice feeds back into imagination in scholarship, and vice versa.’
(Feichtner, p.  982) Constructing a progressivist narrative about the evolution of
sovereign debt management they argue that debt sustainability, despite challenges, is
now a principle of international law recalibrating the focus of restructuring toward a
more balanced approach that takes into account the creditors’ rights, but also the debtor
state and the global public interest in financial stability.
The cost of focusing on international legal principles
However, the choice of focusing on international legal principles as the principal legal
mechanisms for dealing with sovereign debt crisis comes at certain costs. First, the
outlook of the project is too broad, and this carries specific conceptual and normative
consequences. Different sovereign debt crises have different origins, unfold in diverse
social and institutional settings (the Eurozone is a typical example of a highly peculiar
legal, economic and political order), or are even just symptoms of diverging deeper
economic pathologies and, therefore, subjecting their resolution to the same principles
can be either unworkable or outright problematic from a progressive point of view. For
example, after the 2012 restructuring and the successive ‘rescue packages’, Greece’s debt
is now mainly owned by public institutions. Therefore, even though the unsustainability
of Greek debt is patently obvious, a write-down would validate the right-wing (and
increasingly, racialised) narrative about hard-working Northerners bailing out the lazy
South and, more importantly, would create an unnecessary tension between the interests
of working people of the North and the South of the EU. Rather, proposals about a more
pro-active role of the European Central Bank that would enable euro area states to
pursue redistributive policies without nominally writing off debt strike a much better
balance, to the benefit of all working people across Europe.
On the other hand, in cases where debt is primarily held by private creditors, the above
considerations would arguably not apply. Arguably, an approach that focuses on the
general normatively of international legal principles is inherently unable, or at the very
least not well situated, to grasp these distinctions, unless those principles are removed
from most of their substantive meaning. Therefore, Bohoslavsky and Goldmann make, in
my opinion, their most valuable contributions when they discuss specific solutions to
specific problems, such as the imposition of limitations to holdout litigation. Even though
such a research focus does not necessarily flow naturally from the understanding of the
authors about the appropriate outlook and functions of the discipline, it can produce
concrete progressive solutions even without claiming alterations to the broader fabric of
international law.
Human rights: powerless companions?
Interestingly, such a disciplinary understanding can also narrow down the scope of
inquiry into the interplay between international law and sovereign debt. The Polanyian
outlook of this approach that seeks to embed markets, including markets of sovereign
debts into broader social fields, is coupled with a particular understanding of states as
‘protectors of their citizens and providers of welfare’. Still, it is worth reflecting whether
this conception corresponds to the realities of the modern state as embedded, amongst
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other things, in the structures of international law. Boholavsky and Goldmann might refer
to the conditionalities accompanying bailouts and debt restructurings, but the special
issue deals with the question mostly through the conceptual vehicle of human rights.
However, conditionalities have been consistently a highly-intrusive and effective method
of un-doing the state as a guarantor of welfare and transforming it into a guarantor of
competitive markets. After all, it is worth recalling that Polanyi himself sarcastically
summarised the League of Nation’s implication with the Austrian financial crisis as
follows:  ‘The prestige of Geneva rested on its success in helping Austria and Hungary to
restore their currencies, and Vienna became the Mecca of liberal economists on account
of a brilliantly successful operation on Austria’s krone which the patient, unfortunately,
did not survive.’ (p. 25) Much more modestly, Bradlow’s contribution proposes
mechanisms of accountability for the human rights obligations of creditors, while
Bohoslavsky constructs a complex and persuasive narrative between economic inequality
and economic crises, even though his straightforward conceptualisation of inequality as a
human rights issue is somewhat less persuasive. Importantly, this approach does not
facilitate broader reflections on the disciplining functions of debt crises and
restructurings. In this context, human rights have turned out to be at best a ‘powerless
companion’ (Moyn, p. 147): their global ascendance coincided chronologically with the
debt crises of Latin America and the expansion of the role of the international financial
institutions as well as with the explosion of economic inequality without them providing
any significant counterweight.
Further, even though human rights might be able to rectify the very worst excesses of
austerity, they are unable to counterbalance the structures of class domination and
exploitation embedded in structural adjustments, the political instability that
accompanies externally-imposed reform, and the macro-economic impact of shrinking
GDPs, deflation or falling share of labour in national incomes. More broadly, a more
systematic analysis of the effects of conditionality and debt-driven governance on states
and the international system itself would not necessarily have shifted the focus of this
special issue away from its rigorous combination of theory and practice. However, it
could have pointed toward different articulations of the two, as well as toward a different,
perhaps more critical, understanding of the role of international lawyers.
All things considered, it is impossible to summarise and comment on the extensive,
insightful work that both the editors and the contributors put into this special issue. The
persistence of the problem and general political unwillingness to resolve it in a minimally
progressive and socially constructive manner means that this work will remain relevant
for the years to come. In this context, it is worth reflecting that specific ways of
combining theory and practice create different audiences and, more importantly, anchor
one’s academic endeavours to broader political and economic projects. In what appears
to be a dawning age of great discontent, one of the biggest challenges for progressive
scholars will be to anchor our work not only to ‘activist governments and courts’, but also
(and even more importantly) to transnational social movements and to the struggles of
organised labour and democratic citizenship.
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